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Abstract—Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) with ad-
vanced sensing and computing technologies are expected to
support a whole new set of services including pedestrian and
vehicular safety, internet access for vehicles, and eventually,
driverless cars. Wireless communication is a major driving factor
behind ITS, enabling reliable communication between vehicles,
infrastructure, pedestrians and network, generally referred to
as vehicle to everything (V2X) communication. However, the
broadcast nature of wireless communication renders it prone
to jamming, eavesdropping and spoofing attacks which can
adversely affect ITS. Keeping in view this issue, we suggest the
use of an intelligent security framework for V2X communication
security, referred to as intelligent V2X security (IV2XS), to
provide a reliable and robust solution capable of adapting to
different conditions, scenarios and user requirements. We also
identify the conditions that impact the security and describe the
open challenges in achieving a realistic IV2XS system.
Index Terms—V2X, physical layer security, 5G, eavesdropping,
spoofing, jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen a significant rise in the hype
regarding autonomous vehicles and intelligent transportation
systems (ITS). The prime motivation behind these concepts is
to handle the ever-increasing number of road accidents (World
Health Organization (WHO) reported 1.25 million fatalities
in 2013, and millions of serious injuries [1]), and decrease
the traffic congestion, essentially ensuring efficient and safer
mobility. Other advantages of ITS include reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions and decrease in fuel usage which conse-
quently helps in reservation of non-renewable fossil fuels.
The major driving technologies behind ITS include artificial
intelligence (AI), sensor networks, control systems and com-
munication networks. The latter component arguably enjoys
the most importance since it enables the coordination of the
vehicle with all systems, either on-board, in the environment
or located at a central controlling entity.
The generic term given to vehicular communication is
vehicle-to-anything (V2X), which incorporates vehicle’s com-
munication with the network (V2N), other vehicles (V2V), in-
frastructure (V2I) and even pedestrians (V2P). A V2X system
is expected to communicate with other vehicles and infrastruc-
ture to ensure road safety and optimize the traffic flow. On the
other hand, V2N can be used to provide internet connectivity
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to the user. This necessitates a suitable communication system
that takes into consideration all the possible components that
need to communicate, the operating environment, possible use
cases and individual user requirements.
The traditional approach to vehicular communication uses
a technique known as dedicated short range communications
(DSRC). While DSRC works efficiently for V2V and limited
V2I scenarios, it lacks the scalability for large scale V2I or
V2N communications. On the other hand, fifth generation of
wireless communications (5G) promises to provide ubiquitous
connectivity to all kinds of users, be it humans or machines,
by moving its focus from only enhancing mobile broadband
(eMBB), to targeting other services including ultra-reliable
low latency (uRLLC) and massive machine-type communica-
tions (mMTC). V2X constitutes a particularly interesting use
case for 5G since it does not fall under a single service class,
and therefore, cellular-based V2X (C-V2X) has been the focus
of recent attention for autonomous vehicle industry.
While provision of seamless connectivity is the primary
objective of a communication system, the importance of its
security can not be ignored, particularly in the digital age. In
an AI-based use case like self-driving cars, security becomes
paramount since a breach can have significant repercussions,
with limited or no human supervision serving as a fail-safe
backup to the machine. V2X systems need to ensure security
against malicious attacks targeting system performance, user
and data privacy. These attacks range from stealing user
information to manipulating the communication in destructive
manner. User identification and authentication are particularly
sensitive since they determine the legitimate access of users
to data/services. However, owing to the broadcast nature of
wireless communications, its security is a significant challenge
and has resulted in significant research targeted at resolving
this problem.
The prevalent wireless communication security techniques
can be categorized into i) Cryptographic techniques and ii)
Physical layer security (PLS) techniques, the former are key-
based approaches usually applied at higher network layers
but key management has become more challenging with the
heterogenous network (HetNet) deployment in 5G networks.
This gave rise to PLS techniques [2] that utilize the dynamic
properties of wireless communication, i.e., channel, interfer-
ence and noise to provide security to the users.
5G V2X communications has a variety of use cases and
scenarios with their own independent security requirements.
These demands may vary on the basis of different conditions,
such as location, time, user density etc. This motivates the
need of an adaptive and flexible PLS security approach which
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2can cater to the varying requirements. In this work, we present
such a solution for V2X communication called Intelligent V2X
security (IV2XS) 1. Specifically, the idea is based on providing
an intelligent security solution by using an Intelligent engine.
This engine learns information about conditions from radio
environment and higher network layers to provide the best
possible PLS solution in a proactive manner, satisfying the
security requirements of the user and application.
In this article, we first provide a quick overview of compo-
nents of V2X communication and the corresponding channel
characteristics in Section II. This is followed by a brief
description of security threats and possible physical layer
security solutions in Section III. Section IV presents the
motivation of IV2XS and its basic principles. We conclude
the paper by discussing open issues of IV2XS in Section V.
II. V2X COMMUNICATION AND CHANNEL
CHARACTERISTICS
A. V2X Components and Topology
As mentioned earlier V2X is an umbrella term for vehicular
communications and it involves a vehicle’s communication
with different classes of components, all of which have their
own corresponding applications. Fig. 1 gives an overview of a
V2X system involving V2I links for traffic management, V2N
for real-time routing, V2V for collision avoidance and V2P
for providing safety alerts to pedestrians and cyclists.
Multiple communication standards have been developed in
recent years to ensure interoperability in information exchange
of vehicles [4]. V2X supports both direct communication
as well as communication over a cellular network. More
specifically, V2V, V2I, and V2P generally operate in ITS bands
while V2N operates in traditional mobile broadband licensed
spectrum. Direct communication is suitable for latency critical
applications concerned with safety and reliability. On the
other hand, network based communication is feasible for
latency tolerant use cases, such as telematics or infotainment.
Moreover, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are special
mobile ad hoc networks, where vehicles communicate with
roadside units (RSU). However, due to high relative speed of
vehicles there will be short-lived V2X connections, resulting
in a continuously changing topology.
B. V2X Channel Characteristics and 5G
V2X has a channel unlike any other communication appli-
cation. The primary point of difference is the extremely low
temporal correlation of the channel due to the rapidly chang-
ing environment, which is a consequence of the continuous
vehicular mobility. High Doppler spread is a direct effect of
the mobility, which results in low channel coherence time.
V2X is a particularly unique use case since it does not fall
under a single 5G-defined class of service. Instead it has some
aspects of all three services [5]. For instance, the safety related
messages of V2X have strict latency and reliability constraints,
which corresponds to the uRLLC service. Infotainment and
1It is an extension and application of our previously proposed security
concept to 5G-V2X [3]
RSU
Cloud
Fig. 1. An overview of V2X communication
other rich data sharing has an element of eMBB while the
sheer number of vehicles on road relates to the mMTC service
of 5G.
The enabling technologies that can help in achieving re-
quirements of V2X, particularly for 5G, include software
defined networking (SDN), beamforming, millimeter wave
(mmWave), D2D communications, heterogenous networks
(HetNet), massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO),
network function virtualization (NFV) and networking slicing
[6].
III. SECURITY THREATS IN V2X AND SOLUTIONS
A. Security Threats in V2X
The broadcast nature of wireless V2X communication
makes it vulnerable to eavesdropping, spoofing and jamming
attacks as shown in Fig. 2. In the case of eavesdropping,
an illegitimate receiver tries to intercept the communication
between legitimate parties thus violating the confidentiality
and privacy. While in the case of jamming, the illegitimate
node generates intentional interference to disrupt the com-
munication between the legitimate nodes in V2X. Finally, in
the spoofing attack, the control of the communication channel
between the legitimate parties is taken by spoofer. The spoofer
can replace, modify and intercept the message that is being
transmitted between two legitimate parties [2].
There are two popular security approaches to tackle these
attacks in V2X communication: cryptography-based solutions
[7] and PLS-based solutions. The cryptography-based solu-
tions are not enough for V2X and future wireless commu-
nication due to the following reasons: Firstly, due to the
heterogeneous and time-varying nature of V2X communica-
tion, key management processes are quite challenging. Sec-
ondly, future V2X networks are expected to offer a diverse
range of scenarios and services that may require a different
levels of communication security which cryptography based
approaches cannot provide. Thirdly, the transceivers in some
of the wireless technologies are processing-restricted, power
3limited and delay sensitive which makes encryption based
approaches unsuitable. In order to handle these issues, PLS
techniques have emerged as an effective security solution for
future V2X communication. PLS exploits the dynamic features
of wireless communication to provide secure communication.
PLS has the following potentials as a solution for future
communication security. Firstly, PLS approaches can extract
keys from time varying wireless channel thus avoiding key
management issues. Secondly, channel dependent link and
resource adaptation can be exploited to provide a different
level of security in order to support diverse services with dif-
ferent levels of security. Thirdly, PLS security approaches are
suitable for power restricted and delay sensitive applications
because they can be implemented by relatively simple signal
processing algorithms [2].
Jammer
a) Eavesdropper ti
b) Jammer ti
c) Spoofer tj, j≠i
BS
Spoofer
Eavesdropper
RSU
tj
Fig. 2. Types of security threats in V2X communication. Communication
among legitimate parties, eavesdropper and jamming attack occur at the same
time, ti while spoofer will first hear the transmission at ti and then send a
spoofing message at tj
B. Physical Layer Security Solutions in V2X
In this subsection potential of physical layer security solu-
tions for V2X against eavesdropping, spoofing and jamming
are presented.
1) Anti-eavesdropping: There are plenty of physical layer
security techniques in the literature [2] against eavesdropping
such as: Channel-based adaptation techniques (The basic idea
is to optimize the parameters of the transmitter based on
the channel characteristics of legitimate parties, for example,
beamforming, adaptive modulation and coding, etc.), Key ex-
traction from wireless channels (High rate keys are generated
by using unique characteristics of a channel [8]), Addition
of artificially interfering noise (The basic idea is to add an
interfering signal by exploiting the null space of the legitimate
user’s channel to degrade the performance of eavesdropper. In
the case of V2X communication, the geometry of roads and
natural limitation on the location of eavesdropper can also be
exploited to inject the artificial noise [8]).
2) Anti-spoofing: In order to avoid spoofing attacks, effi-
cient authentication methods are employed. There are two ba-
sic types of authentication: message authentication and entity
authentication. Message and entity authentication can be done
effectively at the physical layer by using channel/location-
based and radiometric (hardware based) fingerprinting [9] [10].
For example, in [9], a fast authentication method is proposed
that exploits inherent physical layer features of the user, while
in [11], wireless channel responses are used for authentication.
3) Anti-jamming: There are many techniques in the liter-
ature to tackle jamming attacks. They can be broadly classi-
fied into three major classes: multi-antenna-based interference
cancellation, cooperative communication schemes, and spread
spectrum (SS) techniques. Multi-antenna based approach is
an effective anti-jamming approach because of its interference
avoidance ability from unwanted sources [12]. Cooperative
relaying schemes are also effective anti-jamming approaches
because of their ability to re-route the traffic [13]. Spread
Spectrum (SS) techniques (e.g, direct sequence spread spec-
trum (DSSS), frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), and
their hybrid version have been used against jamming attacks
by spreading the signal or by rapid frequency switching [14].
In the aforementioned discussion we present important
physical layer techniques against attack in wireless commu-
nication. However, cross-layer security designs for V2X can
further improve the capability of systems against eavesdrop-
ping, spoofing and Jamming attacks [2].
IV. INTELLIGENT SECURITY DESIGN FOR V2X
COMMUNICATION
This section describes the motivation behind IV2XS, the
flow of an IV2XS methodology and identifies the parameters
that dictate the particular security technique to be used for a
particular scenario.
A. Motivation for Intelligent Security
We need to understand that security needs vary depending
on the environment and application. It is rather naive to
have a static security scheme in a wireless communication
system, particularly in a scenario which consists primarily of
moving vehicles, causing continuous variation of the channel.
This limitation of current security techniques motivates the
inception of IV2XS.
The existing solutions might satisfy the security needs for a
subset of V2X scenarios while failing at others. For instance,
channel-based key generation techniques assume channel reci-
procity, and would fail if the legitimate transceiver were
to use a different frequency. Similarly, directional solutions
would not work if the legitimate and illegitimate receivers
were co-located. Spread spectrum techniques are used for
protection against jamming, however they fail to protect the
communication against spoofing.
A few scenarios where the current solutions fail are men-
tioned above to reiterate the importance of an adaptive and
intelligent security solution. Such a solution would also help in
efficient utilization of resources by only allocating the security
resources in situations where they are needed. For instance a
single car travelling on a deserted road in clear weather is not
as much of a risk from an attack as a car at a busy junction
in foggy conditions is. Hence, it is possible and advisable to
4adjust the resource allocation for security depending on the
conditions. This is something that the current algorithms are
incapable of. Additionally, present security techniques assume
individual attacker, which means they will fail if the attackers
cooperate with each other to sabotage the communication
system security of V2X system at risk [2].
B. Intelligent Security Design
Having established the need of an adaptive solution, we
extend the idea of cognitive security presented in [3] to
achieve an intelligent security solution for V2X communica-
tion. IV2XS uses an intelligent radio engine (analogous to a
brain) which is capable of learning information from higher
network layers and radio environment. Based on this infor-
mation it is capable of making decisions that can proactively
provide optimized and customized security to the users. Here it
is important to mention current solutions are reactive, i.e., they
try to secure the communication once an attack is detected. In
our case we propose an proactive approach, which means our
solution takes precautions depending on the importance of a
task or criticality of the user without waiting for an attack to
be reported. The conditions that affect the decision making
include location, environment, utility, application and time.
Their details will be discussed in the following subsections.
IV2XS concept can provide adaptive, reliable, robust and
comprehensive security solutions for wireless communication.
Fig. 3 shows the conceptual system model for IV2XS. Con-
dition detector gets the information from radio channel and
higher network layers, from which it identifies the prevalent
condition of the user. IV2XS engine acts the brain of the
operation, adapting the security to an appropriate level for
the detected condition while taking into consideration the
available resources. It is worth mentioning that the IV2XS
should not be confused with context-aware security concept.
In context-aware security, the information is mainly obtained
by different sensors on the basis of which higher layers try to
figure out if there is an attack, in which case the necessary
security arrangements are made. On the other hand, in the
case of IV2XS determines the appropriate security algorithm
is implemented regardless of the occurrence of any attack.
The resource allocation for security depends on the intensity
of threat, which in turn depends on the conditions i.e., location,
environment, utility, application and time (the details about
these conditions are presented in the following section). It
follows intuition that an application requiring high level of
security would be allocated more resources, allowing the im-
plementation of more sophisticated algorithms for protection
against eavesdropping, jamming and spoofing attacks.
C. Significance of Intelligent Security
In a real-life V2X communication system, comprising of
different scenarios occurring simultaneously, IV2XS can po-
tentially provide the following significant advantages
1) Increase in reliability of V2X communication systems:
The adaptable nature of IV2XS allows adjustment of security
levels to ensure targeted reliability. Particularly in the case of
jamming attacks it is difficult to satisfy the required quality of
service (QoS) requirements with a static security scheme.
Condition
detector
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adaptation
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Fig. 3. Conceptual system model for IV2XS approach.
2) Reduction of system complexity: Unlike traditional tech-
niques which offer reactive security mechanisms, detection of
attack is not necessary for security provision in IV2XS, which
results in reduction of system complexity.
3) Increasing data rate: The optimized resource allocation
avoids wastage of resources for security by allocating them for
security only where it is necessary, thereby ensuring rest of
the resources are used appropriately, improving the data rate
of the system.
4) Decreasing the energy consumption: Adaptive security
levels allow users with lower threat to send/receive data
with better energy efficiency since their resources are not
unnecessarily used for security provision.
D. Conditions Affecting Intelligent Security
This section described the different parameters, hereon
referred to as ’conditions’ that dictate the security level and
its associated adaptations at the IV2XS engine.
1) Location: Location of the user is an important parameter
from the point of view of security. It is safe to say that
the security threats and user location have a high degree
of correlation. Consider the case where two vehicles are
following each other on an otherwise deserted road, they only
need to know about the other vehicle’s speed and distance
to keep a safe cushion to avoid any collision. Now take the
case of two vehicles at an intersection (see Fig. 4), there
is an increased number of factors that affect the decision
making process for the cars about when to move and in which
direction. Not only do these cars need to communicate with
each other but also monitor the road for any other traffic
coming towards them from other directions. A security breach
in this situation, specifically spoofing or jamming can cause
traffic accidents. For instance, the spoofer may send the same
message to two vehicles such as the priority of who would pass
first or the jammer may block the transmission, causing traffic
mismanagement. This example highlights the importance of
location not only for the communication itself, but also how
this location can affect the security requirements.
5IV2X can be used to raise the level of security for the
latter scenario once it detects the location to be an intersection,
ensuring nothing untoward happens. Similarly, in the case of
platooning, i.e., when a group of vehicles coordinate with each
other and move closely at high speed, with a lead vehicle
which decides the speed and direction of movement (see Fig.
4), security is very critical. So is it in the case of mountains or
bridges or generally any location that can act as a bottleneck
for traffic. On the other hand, the required security level inside
gated communities or university campuses is relatively low.
High security threat
Attacker
RSU
Fig. 4. A typical scenario for explaining different conditions of IV2X scheme.
2) Environment: The social environment is primarily cat-
egorized into rural, suburban and urban. These environments
differ from each other on the basis of population, traffic density
and available infrastructure. Environment is a significant factor
in deciding the security levels. The traffic density is higher in
urban areas, and it is logical to assume these areas would also
be attacked more often which consequently dictates the level
of security needed.
Fig. 5 shows the relation between security needs and type of
environment in terms of probability of attacks. It is important
to note that this figure is not obtained as a result of any
simulation/experiment, instead it is drawn to illustrate the
relationship between environment and security needs. It gives
the general idea about how rural areas are a less prone to
these attacks, and therefore, can use their limited resources
more efficiently, achieving better data rates.
3) Utility: Another factor that determines the necessary
level of security is the type of vehicle and its usage. The ve-
hicles may be private (belonging to individual or companies),
public (public transportation, municipality vehicles) or belong
to emergency services like police, ambulance or fire brigades.
It is common sense that in the case of an emergency the latter
category of vehicles should be given priority on the road and
in the communication. Till now we have not considered any
security breach in the system.
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Fig. 5. The figure shows the relationship among probability of attack, data
rate and resources allocated to security for different environment based on
IV2X concept
However, if we consider a successful breach, it is logical
that a breach which targets an emergency vehicle can cause
more damage than that of an individual’s vehicle which means
these vehicles need higher security. Similarly, the security
level of the leader of platoon is different as compared to
other members. Eavesdropping, jamming and spoofing attacks
in case of the critical services vehicles can cause serious
problems. Therefore, IV2Xs needs to take into consideration
the purpose of the vehicle before assigning a security level to
it.
4) Application: From the security perspective, application
is an important parameter for IV2XS concept. There are differ-
ent types of applications in V2X communication that may be
safety-related (e.g., collision avoidance and cooperative driv-
ing, queue warning), traffic-related (e.g., optimizing the traffic
flow), infotainment (e.g., Internet access and video streaming),
payment applications (e.g., toll collection), location-based
application (e.g., finding the closest fuel station). The above-
mentioned applications require different level of communi-
cation security. Some of them (safety-related applications)
require very high level of communication security while others
may require lower level of security (infotainment). In order
to ensure secure communication, more resources need to be
allocated for security while a high data rate is vital for
infotainment.
The security level can be significantly increased by IV2XS
engine, if needed, for certain applications. For example, in
case of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assisted V2X, the UAV
can be used as a traffic indicator at intersections or to provide
video streaming. The IV2XS engine can allocate the resources
appropriately to fulfill the requirement of the application used
by UAV. In this case, to be immune to attacks, the IV2X might
increase the security of UAV that is being used for traffic
6indication.
5) Situation/Time: Existing security threats would differ
based on time and situation in which communication is being
held for each application. The density of vehicles is different
at different times. For example, the vehicle density is high
during day, particularly during office hours and it is generally
low at night. In general, the probability of threats increases
with the increase in the density. The IV2XS engine will adjust
the security resources accordingly.
Situation may also affect the security requirements, for
instance the security requirements would be different in times
of peace and war. Eavesdropping might be the dominant form
of attack in the former, while the latter would see more of
jamming and spoofing.
Additionally, weather conditions would also effect the V2X
communication requirements. For instance the required latency
of V2V messaged would be different for a normal road as
compared to that for a road that is slippery due to snow etc.
This would in turn affect the security requirements.
Here we need to point out that this study is not aimed
at presenting new security algorithms. Rather, we suggest an
intelligent framework for V2X communication security which
is capable of adapting to the different conditions, scenarios
and user requirements that have been described above.
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN ISSUES
Security is pivotal in wireless communication, particularly
in a use case like V2X that depends heavily on seamless and
reliable connectivity between its different components. In this
paper we have proposed the use of an intelligent framework
that detects the condition of a user, considers the channel
information and then makes a decision about the best suited
security level for that user. Given below are some of the open
challenges, solving which would go a long way in making this
IV2XS concept a reality.
A. How to detect if a condition exists?
The adaptation of security depends on the condition infor-
mation, which makes identification of the condition impera-
tive.
While some of the information such as user location is com-
paratively easier to determine, attaining information regarding
the application under use is much more difficult. This is where
the challenge lies, i.e., to determine what, if any, parameters to
be obtained from higher network layers and how to collaborate
with those layers?
B. How to identify the best-suited level of security for any
condition?
Once the user’s condition is determined, the next step is to
define the corresponding security level. One possible approach
might be to have a few predefined security levels to which the
conditions would be mapped. Though this approach would
decrease the complexity of this step, it might not provide the
optimum security level. Balancing this trade-off, or proposing
an improved approach is an open research area.
C. Which security mechanism to use and how many resources
should radio allocate?
The next step after identifying the condition and its corre-
sponding security level, the next step is deciding the best suited
mechanisms to achieve that goal. Similar to the approach
mentioned for security level detection, we may consider a
predefined set of security algorithms that can be mapped to
the different levels of required security. On the other hand,
it is possible to explore combinations of these techniques or
proposition of new ones. AI or machine learning based ap-
proaches [15] might be helpful in finding the best combination
of security algorithms.
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